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I. INTRODUCTION
Sentencing is a term that is often used to refer to the decision made
by the judge or jury concerning the appropriate disposition for a con-
victed defendant in a criminal case. This narrow frame of reference ob-
scures the role played by a number of different actors and agencies in
determining what happens to those convicted of crimes. The legislature
establishes appropriate sentence ranges as well as a myriad of procedural
and substantive laws that impact on sentencing. The prosecutor plays a
major role in determining the potential and actual disposition of a de-
fendant by making decisions concerning the appropriate type and
number of charges to file, by engaging in or refraining from plea negotia-
tions, and by making strategic decisions about matters which affect dis-
position, such as whether to seek recidivist sentence enhancements.
Prison administrators and parole officials make decisions that affect the
length and conditions of incarceration, such as awarding and revoking
good time and parole.
Thus, viewed broadly, "sentencing" is a process involving many
stages and agencies, rather than just a single judicial decision. The com-
plex relationships involved between the various components often result
in one agency undercutting the decision of another. For example, a zeal-
ous prosecutor may charge a very serious offense or seek a number of
convictions, only to have the judge or jury grant probation or concurrent
sentences. A very lengthy sentence may result in little time served in
prison if liberal awards of good time advance parole eligibility and subse-
quently parole is granted.
Because of the complex web of agencies that have a role in determin-
ing the disposition of a convicted defendant, changes in the rules of sen-
tencing must be analyzed at several different levels to determine their
true impact. This article will examine recent legislative changes affecting
criminal sentences in Texas enacted by the Seventieth Legislature in an
attempt to assess their impact. After a brief background discussion con-
cerning the Texas system of sentencing and sentence administration, this
article will review some of the major enactments of the Seventieth Legis-
lature which appear to diminish the possibilities of early release from
prison. Some of the factors which will tend to undercut the impact of the
new legislation and the increasingly complex relationships between the
legislative, judicial, and administrative components of the criminal jus-
tice system which have emerged after the Seventieth Legislature will be
explored.
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II. INDETERMINATE SENTENCING IN TEXAS
A. Parole Eligibility and Mandatory Release
In Texas, a determination of guilt by a trier of fact is not dispositive
of the type or length of sentence a defendant will receive. For example,
the punishment range provided by statute for a defendant convicted of a
first-degree felony is life in prison or a term of five to ninety-nine years.'
In light of the fact that probation is a possibility for a defendant con-
victed of a first-degree felony, the potential range of penalties is even
broader than that which appears on the face of the statute.2
Broad discretion, however, is not limited to the judge or jury when
determining sentence. Even when a sentence of imprisonment within the
legislatively prescribed range has been selected by the trier of fact, the
actual term of imprisonment is unknown at the time that sentence is im-
posed since the actual period of incarceration is left for determination by
administrative authorities. For an inmate in the Texas prison system,
there are two important dates which occur between the beginning and
the expiration of the sentence selected by the judge or the jury that will
determine the actual length of incarceration-the parole eligibility date
and the mandatory release date. Although the Texas Board of Pardons
and Paroles ("Board") is not required to grant parole when the parole
eligibility date is reached, this is the earliest point at which the Board is
empowered to grant release.' If parole is granted, the balance of the term
is served by the inmate in the community under supervision of a parole
officer, subject to various conditions.4
1. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (determination of guilt
of first-degree felony results in incarceration for five to ninety-nine years or life). A first-degree
felon may also be fined up to $10,000. Id. § 12.32(b).
2. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3a(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Upon
sworn pretrial motion filed by the defendant, the jury may recommend probation for any fel-
ony conviction so long as the recommended sentence does not exceed 10 years. The court is
then required to probate the sentence upon such recommendation by the jury. In addition, the
court, when acting without a jury, may only assess probation for sentences of less than 10
years. Id. § 3. Therefore, a conviction for a first degree felony, such as murder, for which the
recommended sentence is less than 10 years, may be suspended and probated. See id. §§ 3-
3a(a).
3. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (autho-
rizes release of inmates eligible for parole). With the exception of certain listed classifications,
prisoners become eligible for parole when the sum of their calendar time served plus accrued
good time is one-fourth of the maximum sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less. Id.
§ 8(b)(1).
4. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 13 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (general
grant of rule-making authority to Board for conduct of persons placed on parole or released to
mandatory supervision). Conditions that may be imposed upon a parolee include: restitution
or reparation to the victim of his crime; repayment of court costs and fees of a public defender
or appointed counsel; attendance at psychological counseling sessions or basic education
1989]
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Unlike parole, which is granted solely in the discretion of the Board,
an inmate must be released when the mandatory release date arrives.'
The mandatory release date is determined by subtracting the amount of
good time earned by an inmate from the total sentence imposed.6 At this
date, the inmate must be released from custody even if the parole board,
in its discretion, has repeatedly denied early release on parole.7 An in-
mate released under mandatory release supervision serves the balance of
the term under parole supervision in the same fashion as an inmate re-
leased on discretionary parole.
B. The Award of Good Time
"Good time" is the time authorized by statute as a reward for good
behavior which is deducted from or credited to the sentence to be served
by an offender confined in a correctional institution.9 Under Texas law,
the award of good time serves two functions: determination of the
mandatory release date and advancement of the parole eligibility date.
The mandatory release date is the date at which the defendant must be
released from custody unless good time is revoked by prison officials for a
violation of the rules of the institution.'" The date at which an inmate
becomes eligible for parole under Texas law is also advanced for certain
inmates by the award of good time."
Prior to the actions of the Seventieth Legislature, the basic rule of
parole eligibility in Texas was that an inmate was eligible for parole when
his actual time served plus good-conduct time equaled one-third of the
maximum sentence or twenty years, whichever was less.12 For example,
an inmate sentenced to a ten-year sentence who earned no good time
would become eligible for parole under this law after three years and four
classes; avoidance of all contact with his victim; agreement to intensive supervision release
program, including electronic monitoring or residence at a halfway house. See id. § 8(g)(l)-
(5). Violation of any condition of parole, however, may result in the reincarceration of the
parolee. See id. § 14(a)-(b).





10. Id. § 8(a), (c).
11. See id. § 8(b)(1). An inmate's parole eligibility date may be advanced by the award of
good time unless his conviction was for capital murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
sexual assault or aggravated robbery, or it is affirmatively shown that a deadly weapon was
used or exhibited during the commission of an offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
42.12, § 3g(a)(l)-(2).
12. Adult Paroleand Mandatory Supervision Law, ch. 427, § 2(8)(b), 1985 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1549, 1551, amended by Prisoners-Good Conduct Time and Eligibility for Parole or
Mandatory Supervision, ch. 384, § 5, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3756, 3759 (Vernon).
286 [Vol. 30:283
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months. With the exception of inmates who have been sentenced to
death, the rule remains that all inmates who enter the Texas Department
of Corrections generally are put into a category in which the inmate
earns twenty days for each thirty days of actual calendar time served.13
Thus, the end of a thirty-day month, the inmate is given credit for having
served fifty days in prison. Assuming that an inmate sentenced to ten
years imprisonment remained in this class I category,' 4 without forfei-
ture or gain in good time, the parole eligibility date of three years and
four months (one-third of ten years) would be reduced to two years. The
inmate would be required to serve at least two years in prison before the
Board would have the authority to grant release. Even if the Board re-
peatedly denied discretionary parole, such an inmate would be man-
datorily released from custody after six years unless good time was
revoked for violations of disciplinary rules of the prison. The time be-
tween two years and six years is the discretionary period in which the
Board is empowered, but not required, to grant parole.
Few inmates in the Texas Department of Corrections remain within
the class I category of twenty days of good time per month. For viola-
tions of prison rules, an inmate could be reduced to class II or class III,
earning either ten days good time per month, or no good time.'" Greater
awards of good time are also possible. For example, an inmate who is
awarded the designation of "trusty", which is short for trustworthy,
could earn up to an additional twenty-five days of good time for each
month. 6 An inmate earning the maximum amount of trusty good time
would then be earning forty-five days of good time per month'7 or, in
other words, seventy-five days of credit for each thirty. calendar days ac-
tually served. An inmate in this category would become eligible for pa-
role on a ten-year sentence in only one year and four months, and would
reach a mandatory release date on the ten-year sentence in four years.
In addition to the statutory award of good time and trusty good
time, it is possible to earn fifteen extra days of good time per month for
13. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6181-1, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
14. Id. § 3(a)(1).
15. Id. § 3(a)(2), § 3(a)(3)(b).
16. Prisons and Prisoners-Good Conduct Time-Amount and Time Spent in County
Jail, ch. 375, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2045, amended by Prisoners-Good Conduct Time and
Eligibility for Parole or Mandatory Supervision, ch. 384, § 3, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3756,
3757 (Vernon) and Prisons and Inmates-Composition, Powers, Duties, and Continuation of
Board of Corrections, Sentencing, and Claims and Actions, ch. 1049, § 14, 1987 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 7064, 7075 (Vernon).
17. This figure is based upon the maximum of 25 days per month for a trusty and 20 days
of class I statutory good time, since only class I inmates are eligible to become trusties. Id. See
also TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6181-1, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
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participation and achievement in an educational, vocational, or work
program.' For example, an inmate who completed an educational pro-
gram, such as a GED equivalency diploma, and who was awarded a
maximum of fifteen extra good days per month for this and other
achievements, could earn as much as sixty extra good days per month
(twenty statutory, twenty-five trusty, and fifteen for educa-
tional/vocational awards) or ninety days of credit for thirty days actually
served.19
C. Deadly Weapon Finding and Enumerated Offenses
One of the most important issues in Texas sentencing law is whether
the judgment of conviction contains a deadly weapon finding,2° or
whether the conviction was for an enumerated offense 2 1 such as capital
murder, 22 aggravated kidnapping, 23 aggravated sexual assault, 24 or ag-
gravated robbery. 25 A convicted defendant falling into either of these
categories is hot eligible to have regular adult probation granted by the
judge. 26 Furthermore, such an inmate must serve day-for-day calendar
time until he is eligible for parole, or until two years have elapsed, which-
ever period is greater, without having that date reduced by good time.27
In contrast, inmates not burdened with a deadly weapon finding or a
conviction for an enumerated offense have their minimum parole eligibil-
ity date advanced based upon the amount of good time earned in cus-
tody.28 The effect of this distinction can be dramatic. For example,
18. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6181-1, § 3(d) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (awarded at the
discretion of director).
19. See supra notes 16-18.
20. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
21. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The
enumerated offenses for the purposes of determining (1) the probation eligibility, and (2) good
time eligibility for the purpose of establishing the parole eligibility date are: capital murder,
aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and aggravated (armed) robbery. Id.
22. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
23. Id. § 20.04 (Vernon 1974).
24. Id. § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
25. Id. § 29.03 (Vernon 1974).
26. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989). Pro-
bation may not be granted if the judge, as the trier of fact, makes an affirmative finding that a
deadly weapon was used or exhibited by the defendant, or if the defendant was convicted of
capital murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault or aggravated robbery. Id.
These restrictions do not apply, however, if a jury is acting as trier of fact and the defendant
has no prior felony convictions and receives less than a 10-year sentence. See id. § 3a(a).
27. Id. art. 42.18, § 8(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1989). A defendant convicted of an enumer-
ated offense or whose judgment contains an affirmative finding of the use or exhibition of a
deadly weapon must serve the lesser of one-fourth the sentence imposed or 15 years, but in no
case less than two years. Id.
28. Id. § 8(a)-(b).
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under the law prior to the amendments of the Seventieth Legislature, an
inmate convicted of one of the enumerated offenses who was given a
sixty-year sentence was required to serve twenty years before becoming
eligible for parole.29 However, an inmate whose parole eligibility date
was accelerated by the good-time rate earned by every inmate upon arri-
val at the Division of Corrections (twenty days of good time for each
thirty days served) would become eligible for parole after twelve years.3"
III. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN SENTENCE ADMINISTRATION BY THE
SEVENTIETH LEGISLATURE
A. New Restrictions on the Use of Good Time
The Seventieth Legislature promulgated an expanded list of "enu-
merated offenses" ' 3' for which the award of good-time credits is curtailed.
To the old list of capital murder, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sex-
ual assault and aggravated robbery, the Seventieth Legislature added:
murder:32 second-degree felony for sexual assault;3 3 first-degree felony
for deadly assault on a law enforcement or corrections officer or court
participant;34 first-degree felony for injury to a child or an elderly indi-
vidual;35 first-degree felony for arson;3 6 second-degree felony for rob-
bery;37 or, first-degree felony for burglary. 38 The additions of the
frequently prosecuted offenses of sexual assault, robbery, and, in particu-
lar, burglary mean that, in the future, a greater number of convicted de-
fendants will be ineligible for the full benefits connected with the award
29. Adult Parole and Mandatory Supervision Law, ch. 427, § 2, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws
1549, 1551 (amended 1987).
30. Prior to the modifications made by the Seventieth Legislature, an inmate given
"trusty" status could earn up to an additional 25 days per month good time and could be
eligible for parole in 8 years on a 60-year sentence. Finally, additional reductions at a rate of
up to 15 days per month for completion of educational and vocational programs could further
advance the date of parole eligibility unless an enumerated offense or deadly weapon finding
prevented such acceleration.
31. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
32. Id. § 8(c)(1) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (Vernon 1974)).
33. Id. § 8(c)(4) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011 (Vernon Supp. 1989)).
34. Id. § 8(c)(7) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.03 (Vernon Supp. 1989)).
35. Id. § 8(c)(8) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 1989)).
36. Id. § 8(c)(9) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.02 (Vernon Supp. 1989)).
37. Id. § 8(c)(10) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02 (Vernon 1974)).
38. Id. § 8(c)(12) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(d)(2)-(d)(3) (Vernon 1974)).
The prohibition against the accrual of good time applies only to convictions under
§ 30.02(d)(2) and (d)(3). Id. Thus, good time, for the purpose of calculating the mandatory
release date, cannot be awarded a prisoner serving a sentence for committing a burglary in
which any party to the crime was armed with explosives or a deadly weapon, or a burglary in
which any party to the crime injured or attempted to injure anyone. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 30.02(d)(2)-(3) (Vernon 1974).
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of good time. 9 Inmates convicted of offenses on this new list will con-
tinue to receive good time credit to advance parole eligibility, but they
are not eligible for mandatory release and will serve their entire sentences
in prison unless discretionary parole is granted.'
This new disadvantage was also applied to those inmates who previ-
ously had been denied good time only for the purpose of accelerating
parole eligibility. Prior to the modifications of the Seventieth Legisla-
ture, inmates who had been convicted of crimes from the old list of enu-
merated offenses or whose judgments contained an affirmative finding of
the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon were awarded good time for the
purpose of determining a mandatory release date, but were denied the
double benefit of subtracting the good time awarded from the date of
parole eligibility.41 With the added prohibition against release to
mandatory supervision," such an inmate will now serve his full sentence
in prison unless discretionary parole is granted by the Board.43 The ef-
fect of this provision is to increase the authority of the parole board to
determine the actual length of incarceration for many inmates, and, per-
haps, to close the gap between the sentence imposed and the time actu-
ally served in confinement."
39. See TEX. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS 1987 FISCAL YEAR STATISTICAL REP. 20 (of total
inmate population of 37,855, 7,734 or 20.45% convicted of robbery, 9,607 or 25.38% con-
victed of burglary, and 3,845 or 10.16% convicted of sexual assault).
40. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The Sev-
entieth Legislature has now provided that: "A prisoner may not be released to mandatory
supervision" if there has been a deadly weapon finding or the prisoner is serving a sentence for
an offense on the expanded list of enumerated offenses. Id. at § 8(c)(l)-(12).
41. Compare Adult Parole and Mandatory Supervision Law, ch. 427, § 2(8)(b), 1985 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1549, 1551 (amended 1987) (good time not considered in calculating parole eligibil-
ity date if judgment contains deadly weapon finding or conviction is for enumerated offense)
with Adult Parole and Mandatory Supervision Law, ch. 427, § 2(8)(c), 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws
1549, 1551 (amended 1987) (mandatory release date calculated by adding calendar time plus
good time).
42. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
43. Id.
44. Because inmates in disqualifying categories will no longer be released to mandatory
supervision by operation of law, the parole board will now have to act affirmatively to grant
parole or the entire sentence imposed by the judge or jury will be served in prison. However,
the pressure to grant discretionary parole created by chronic prison overcrowding may well
diminish the impact of these new measures. See the discussion of the impact of prison over-
crowding at text accompanying footnotes 59 to 70 infra. If paroles are granted liberally to
make more prison beds available, the ineligibility for mandatory release will be unimportant
because discretionary parole will have been granted long before a mandatory release would
have been required. The most important disadvantage may well be the traditional one of ineli-
gibility for accelerated parole consideration which does not apply to the inmates convicted of
crimes from the expanded list of enumerated offenses.
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. Reduced Trusty Good Time
The Seventieth Legislature also made changes which will affect the
length of the sentence of all inmates rather than just those inmates who
fall into the previously described categories. Prior to the Seventieth Leg-
islature, inmates who were accorded the status of trusty could earn up to
twenty-five additional days of good time per month.45 The Seventieth
Legislature amended the good-time statutes to provide that a maximum
of ten additional days of good time could be awarded to a trusty.46 In
light of the fact that over ninety percent of the present Texas prison pop-
ulation has been awarded trusty status,47 the fifteen-day per month re-
duction of the maximum amount of trusty good time is a significant
factor in determining the length of time actually served in custody. Ad-
ditionally, in order for an inmate to be eligible for any good time under
the amendment to the good-time statutes passed by the Seventieth Legis-
lature, the Director of the Texas Department of Corrections must certify
that the inmate is "actively engaged in an agricultural, vocational, or
educational endeavor or in an industrial program or other work pro-
gram, unless the director finds that the inmate is not capable of partici-
pating in such an endeavor. ' 48
C Potential Limitations on Retroactive Awards of Good Time
At the present time, one of the most important ways in which parole
eligibility and mandatory release dates are advanced is through the resto-
ration of good-conduct time that has been forfeited for prison rule viola-
tions and by the retroactive award of additional good-conduct time to
inmates reclassified into higher earning categories. If an inmate violates
prison rules and a prison disciplinary committee determines that some or
all good time previously earned should be forfeited, the committee may,
at some future time, restore all or part of the good time that was for-
feited.49 An inmate who enters the prison earning twenty days of good
time for every thirty days actually served, who is reclassified as a trusty,
and is given additional good time can have the new higher level applied
45. Prisons and Prisoners-Good Conduct Time-Amount and Time Spent in County
Jail, ch. 375, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2045 (amended 1987).
46. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6181-1, § 3(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1989). The statute
now reads that a trusty will receive "not more than 10 additional days ... for each 30 days
actually served ...." Id.
47. See TEX. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, 1987 FISCAL YEAR STATISTICAL REP. 182
(96.13% of all inmates classified as trusties); Interview with Don Keil, Classification Depart-
ment of Texas Department of Corrections, in Huntsville, Texas (Feb. 15, 1988).
48. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6181-1, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
49. Id.
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retroactively to the beginning date of the sentence. The restoration of
forfeited good time and the retroactive award of new classifications
greatly accelerate parole eligibility and mandatory release. The Seventi-
eth Legislature's amendments to the good-time statutes, however, now
mandate that the Texas Board of Corrections ("TBC") annually review
the Department of Corrections' rules and policies. The TBC is required
to consider whether inmate overcrowding has decreased and whether it is
necessary for purposes of decreasing overcrowding to restore good-
conduct time or award additional good-conduct time retroactively to in-
mates who have been reclassified.-" If TBC determines that overcrowd-
ing has decreased and it is not necessary to restore good-conduct time or
award retroactively new grants of additional good-conduct time, "it shall
direct the department to discontinue those practices."'" Although it
does not appear that prison overcrowding will disappear soon, 52 at some
future time this provision may cause the actual incarceration time of in-
mates to increase. The addition of this language to the statutes also
evinces the Legislature's increasingly stringent attitude toward the award
of good time and is consistent with the other actions taken by the Seven-
tieth Legislature.
D. Prohibition of Aggregating Consecutive Sentences
for Parole Eligibility
Under Texas parole law prior to the actions of the Seventieth Legis-
lature, it was the practice of the Board of Pardons and Parole to aggre-
gate all consecutive sentences into one sum in order to determine the
one-third or twenty-year rule for parole eligibility. 3 Inmates with
sentences totalling more than sixty years or inmates with a life sentence
became eligible for parole at twenty years.5 4 Three consecutive fifty-year
sentences or a sentence of ninety-nine years was no different than a sen-
tence of sixty years for purposes of parole eligibility. If the judgment of
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See TEX. CRIM. JUST. SUMMIT, Office of the Governor 4 (Feb. 1988). The Texas
Department of Corrections ("TDC") has experienced a 147.8% increase in admissions of in-
mates since 1980. However, 6% less than the total number of felons convicted were actually
incarcerated in 1987 as compared to 1980. Provisions are currently being made for an addi-
tional 13,356 prison beds, which is expected to absorb the increased inmate population only
through 1990. Id. It is predicted that by the end of 1988, approximately 5,500 prisoners who
have been sentenced to TDC will be held in county jails, unable to be admitted to TDC. Id. at
7.
53. See Adult Parole and Mandatory Supervision Law, ch. 427, § 2(8)(b), 1985 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1549, 1551 (amended 1987).
54. Id.
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conviction did not contain a deadly weapon finding or the conviction was
not for one of the enumerated offenses, twenty-year parole eligibility
could be further reduced in the case of the highest level trusty who also
received the maximum award for participation in educational or voca-
tional programs by a good-time award rate of ninety days for every thirty
days actually served. Thus, an inmate with three ninety-nine-year
sentences would automatically have a parole eligibility of twenty years.
This in turn could be reduced to less than seven years if the highest cate-
gories of good time were earned.
The amendment to-the Texas parole statute by the Seventieth Legis-
lature, however, abolishes aggregation of consecutive sentences. Under
the new statutes, the Board "may not treat consecutive sentences as a
single sentence for purposes of parole and may not release on parole a
prisoner sentenced to serve consecutive felony sentences earlier than the
date on which the prisoner becomes eligible for release on parole from
the last sentence imposed on the prisoner." 5 This amendment will have
no impact on those inmates who are sentenced to concurrent sentences,56
but it could greatly delay the date of eligibility for parole of those inmates
serving consecutive felony sentences. Under the new law, the earliest
possible parole date will be the combined total of the minimum parole
term for each sentence.5 7
IV. FACTORS REDUCING THE IMPACT OF THE AMENDMENTS OF
THE SEVENTIETH LEGISLATURE
A. The Impact of Prison Overcrowding and Legislative Provisions
Favoring Earlier Release From Prison
While the amendments summarized in the last section of this article
appear to make actual time served in custody longer, the changes in the
law have not been uniform. For example, statutory eligibility for parole
was reduced by the Seventieth Legislature. The rule that an inmate is
eligible for parole at one-third of his total sentence or twenty years,
55. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
56. Concurrent sentences, by definition, must be treated as if only one sentence-the
longer one-was imposed. Id.
57. Id. § 8(b)(5). The statute provides:
Calendar time served and good conduct time accrued by a prisoner that are used by
the board in determining when a judgment and sentence cease to operate may not be
used by the board:
(A) for the same purpose in determining that date in a subsequent sentence in the
same series of consecutive sentences; or
(B) for determining the date on which a prisoner becomes eligible for release on
parole from the last sentence in a series of consecutive sentences.
1989]
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whichever is less, was modified to provide parole eligibility at one-fourth
of the total sentence or fifteen years, whichever is less, minus good time.
Thus, under the previous law, an inmate with a sentence of sixty years or
more would be eligible for parole in twenty years, but now eligibility
under the same sentence would occur in fifteen years, less good time.58
The ambivalent nature of the changes made by the Seventieth Legis-
lature is a reflection of competing political pressures. Concern about
crime and a desire to be tougher with criminals may explain many of the
amendments discussed in the first part of this article, but the expanding
prison population and the crisis it creates may account for other provi-
sions that seem to promote earlier release from custody. Although the
legislature has authorized construction of an additional 13,356 prison
beds, 9 it is projected that this increase in capacity will only absorb the
expected rise in the prison population until October 1990.60 The Texas
Department of Corrections currently has a population of 38,578 inmates,
95% of its rated capacity, which reflects a 147.8% increase in admissions
since 1980.61 Admissions to prison in Texas are projected to increase by
19.5% between 1988 and 1994, reaching 46,626 admissions by 1994.62 If
these projections are accurate, the prison population will surpass prison
capacity in November 1990. For this reason, the Texas Department of
Corrections is recommending the funding of 11,159 additional prison
beds during the 1990-91 fiscal years in order to continue to absorb the
expected growth.63
Mounting prison overcrowding has created strong pressure to re-
lease inmates early. The correlation between parole release and prison
overcrowding in Texas has been dramatic:
In 1980 there were 168,099 offenders under regular probation su-
pervision, in prison or in parole supervision out of which 16.9% or
28,543 were incarcerated. ... In 1987 there were 369,449 offend-
ers under regular probation supervision, in prison or in parole su-
pervision out of which 10.6% or 39,227 were incarcerated. 64
The enormous increase in the number of offenders handled by the Texas
criminal justice system between 1980 and 1987 resulted in more than a
6% decline in the proportion of felons in prison despite the fact that the
average sentence imposed actually increased.65 However, the average
58. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
59. See TEX. CRIM. JUST. SUMMIT, Office of the Governor 4 (Feb. 1988).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4.
65. Id.
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time served in prison by inmates released in 1987 was 12 months, less
than one-fourth of the total sentence, compared with an average time
served of 21.29 months in 1982, which was more than one-half of the
total sentence.66
The impact of many of the more stringent changes of the Seventieth
Legislature concerning sentence administration may be blunted by the
need to grant earlier discretionary parole to combat prison overcrowding.
Even if the reduced awards of good time delay the date of parole eligibil-
ity for some inmates, a higher percentage of grants of parole at initial
eligibility may reduce the actual average prison term in the same manner
that longer sentences imposed by judges and juries are undercut by more
liberal grants of parole. New statutory provisions creating ineligibility
for mandatory release will matter little if chronic overcrowding creates
an irresistible pressure for early grants of discretionary parole.
While it appears that many of the actions of the Seventieth Legisla-
ture may have been made in response to demands for greater truth in
labeling of criminal sentences, the Legislature was also cognizant of the
ever-present problem of prison overcrowding as indicated by the reduc-
tion of the parole eligibility date in some cases. Legislative ambivalence
in the face of demands for tougher control of crime and the crisis of
prison overcrowding is reflected in the action of the Seventieth Legisla-
ture in modifying, but retaining, the Texas Prison Management Act.67
The Act provides another means of accelerating release from prison for
some inmates. When the occupancy level of the Texas Department of
Corrections reaches a level of ninety-five percent of capacity, the Act
specifies that certain classes of inmates automatically become eligible for
additional grants of administrative good time.68 The grant of good time
has the effect of advancing an inmate's parole eligibility and parole re-
view dates. For example, the Prison Management Act was invoked three
times in the five weeks between February 26, 1987 and April 3, 1987,
giving over 6,000 inmates additional awards of good-time credit to ad-
vance parole eligibility review under the Act.69
The Prison Management Act has provided a means which has been
utilized administratively to advance parole eligibility, reduce actual time
66. Id. at 5.
67. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6184o (Vernon Supp. 1989).
68. Id. § 2(b).
69. Interview with Pablo Martinez, Planner for the Board of Pardons and Paroles of
Texas (Mar. 1, 1988). On February 26, 1987, 6,666 eligible inmates were given an additional
award of 60 days of good-conduct time. Over 6,500 inmates were given an additional 30 days
one week later. One month after this award of good time, 6,420 inmates were given an addi-
tional 90 days of good-time credit. Id.
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in confinement for certain inmates, and relieve prison overcrowding. On
the other hand, the Seventieth Legislature's actions summarized above
demonstrate a conflicting desire to narrow the gap between sentences im-
posed and time actually served by inmates. In fact, although the Prison
Management Act was kept in force by the Seventieth Legislature, it was
also amended to increase the categories of offenses which make an inmate
ineligible for additional awards of good time.7" Reducing sentences for
convicted criminals does not appear to be a politically popular stand but
neither is designating scarce resources for the construction of prisons to
house more inmates. The result has been an increasingly complex and
contradictory law for the administration of criminal sentences.
B. Ex Post Facto Doctrine
The impact of legislative provisions passed by the Seventieth Legis-
lature which are designed to increase actual time in prison also may be
diminished by judicial interpretation. One important source of limita-
tions on legislative changes in the administration of sentences is the ex
post facto doctrine. The United States Constitution forbids the passage
of any "law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal... changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
committed."71 Article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution also bans
any "retroactive law" that has been applied to penal statutes by Texas
courts.72
In Weaver v. Graham,73 the United States Supreme Court declined
to restrict the ex post facto prohibition to vested rights.74 The Court held
70. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6184o, § 3(b) (1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1989). An
inmate is ineligible for grants of administrative good-time credits under this article if his judg-
ment of conviction contains an affirmative finding that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon in
the commission or immediate flight from any felony, or he was convicted of one of the follow-
ing offenses: capital murder; murder; voluntary manslaughter; kidnapping; aggravated kid-
napping; indecency with a child; sexual assault; aggravated sexual assault; deadly assault on
law enforcement or corrections officer or court participant; injury to a child or elderly individ-
ual; incest; sale or purchase of a child; solicitation of a child; arson; robbery; aggravated rob-
bery; first degree burglary; aggravated promotion of prostitution; compelling prostitution; sale;
distribution; or display of harmful materials to minor; sexual performance by a child; deadly
weapon in penal institution; or criminal attempt; conspiracy; or solicitation of any of the pre-
ceding. In addition an inmate is ineligible for administrative good-time 'credit if serving a
sentence for: aggravated manufacture, delivery or possession of a controlled substance, or
delivery, aggravated delivery or aggravated possession of marijuana. Id. § 3(b)(3).
71. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (emphasis in original); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
72. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
73. 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
74. Id. at 29.
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that
[t]he presence or absence of an affirmative, enforceable right is not
relevant.., to the ex post facto prohibition.... [E]ven if a statute
merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legisla-
ture, it violates the Clause if it is both retrospective and more oner-
ous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.".
In Weaver, a 1978 state statute revised an earlier statute which specified
that a prisoner would receive, depending on the number of years served
in prison, five, ten, or fifteen days of good time per month if no discipli-
nary infractions were found against the prisoner. The revised statute
limited the time granted for mere good conduct to three, six, or nine days
per month. The new provision applied not only to those convicted after
its passage, but also to those previously convicted who had earned good
time after the effective date of the new statute. Weaver claimed this re-
duction would extend his time served by two years before he would reach
his mandatory release date.7 6
The Weaver Court held that reductions in good time, like changes in
parole eligibility, disadvantaged prisoners by reducing their opportunity
to shorten the time they serve in prison by good conduct.77 Although the
statute reducing the number of days of good time awarded per month
provided for other ways to earn credit toward the prisoner's release date,
it did not prevent a successful ex post facto challenge because the "new
provision constricts the inmate's opportunity to earn early release, and
thereby makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed
before its enactment.
78
Weaver demonstrates that statutes which affect parole eligibility,
good time, and mandatory release are subject to ex post facto prohibi-
tions. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals indicated in Ex parte Ale-
gria79 that such changes are subject to the ex post facto limitations of
both the federal and state constitutions. In Ex parte Alegria, at the time
of the commission of the offense in 1961, parole eligibility for a life sen-
tence was fifteen years, but in 1967 the statute was amended to extend
75. Id. at 30-31 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 32. The Court discounted the argument that since the statute would only be
applied prospectively, not retrospectively, it did not lend itself to an ex post facto challenge.
Instead, the Court asserted that it was the effect, not the form, of the law that is crucial to
whether it is ex post facto. Concluding that good time is "one determinant of [a prisoner's]
prison term-and that his effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed," id. at
32, the Court held the statute substantially altered the consequences of a completed crime, and
therefore changed the amount of the punishment. Thus, it could only be applied to Weaver if
it did not detrimentally affect him. Id.
77. Id. at 33-34.
78. Id. at 35-36.
79. 464 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
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the period for parole eligibility to twenty years.80 The court of criminal
appeals found that application of the amended law to Alegria, who had
committed the offense prior to enactment, was violative of the ex post
facto proscription. 81 Alegria demonstrates that the Seventieth Legisla-
ture's action in denying mandatory release for those inmates whose judg-
ments contain a deadly weapon finding can only be applied to those who
are convicted for offenses committed after the effective date of the legisla-
tion. Similarly, one convicted for an offense that was not enumerated
under the prior law could not be subject to the mandatory release prohi-
bition if the offense or any element of it occurred prior to the effective
date of the Act. The same would appear to be true of the new statutory
enactment requiring cumulative treatment for parole eligibility for con-
secutive sentences rather than the prior method of aggregation of
sentences. The legislature avoided possible ex post facto ramifications by
expressly stating that each of the above provisions would apply only to
offenses committed after the effective date of the new legislation, Septem-
ber 1, 1987.82 Thus, the impact of the more stringent rules of sentence
administration will have little immediate impact on the present Texas
prison population.
Although the Prison Management Act as amended by the Seventi-
eth Legislature contains no similar provision mandating prospective ap-
plication, in Ex parte Rutledge,83 the court of criminal appeals indicated
that changes in the Act by the Seventieth Legislature restricting the list
of statutory offenses eligible for the additional grants of good time were
subject to ex post facto limitations.8 4 Under the version of the Act in
effect at the time of the commission of the offense, Rutledge would have
been eligible for an additional grant of good time to advance parole eligi-
bility if and when the Texas Department of Corrections reached an occu-
pancy level of ninety-five percent.85 After Rutledge was convicted,
sentenced and incarcerated, the Seventieth Legislature amended the Act
by listing a number of offenses that are now statutorily designated as
being ineligible for the grant of extra good time.86 Rutledge's offense fell
within the amended list of newly ineligible offenses, and officials at the
Texas Department of Corrections informed him that he was not eligible
80. Id. at 869-70.
81. Id. at 874 (statute automatically extending parole eligibility date unconstitutional be-
cause it "alters the situation of the petitioner to his disadvantage").
82. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18 comment § 18(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989)
(effective date Sept. 1,' 1987).
83. 741 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
84. Id. at 462.




for the disbursement of the Act's good-time credits. The court of crimi-
nal appeals found that the amended Act had been retroactively applied in
a manner that disadvantaged Rutledge in violation of the ex post facto
provisions of both the federal and state constitutions. 7
Rutledge is strong authority for the proposition that any diminution.
in the opportunity to win good-time credits can only be given prospective
application. The Seventieth Legislature wisely avoided constitutional
challenges by providing that the amendments eliminating the award of
good time to determine a mandatory release date for inmates whose judg-
ments contain a deadly weapon or who are convicted of enumerated of-
fenses only apply to offenses committed after the effective date of the new
law.8 8 However, new amendments which provide that there should be no
restoration of forfeited good time and no retroactive credit for increased
good time due to changes in classification are not limited to prospective
application by statute. It is likely, however, that these amendments can-
not be applied to inmates who were already sentenced prior to the effec-
tive date of the amended statute. Although the prohibition of restoration
of forfeited credit and retroactive application of increased good time ap-
plies only when prison overcrowding is no longer found to exist by the
Department of Corrections, 89 prison overcrowding is also a prerequisite
to the applicability of the Prison Management Act, which provides extra
awards of good time only when the occupancy level of the Texas Depart-
ment of Corrections reaches the level of ninety-five percent of capacity.9"
This contingent application of the Prison Management Act did not pre-
vent the Rutledge court from requiring prospective application of the
Act.9
It appears that only one of the major amendments by the Seventieth
Legislature discussed in this article would apply retroactively: the
change in parole, eligibility from one-third of the sentence imposed or
twenty years to one-fourth of the sentence imposed or fifteen years. Be-
cause this enactment is beneficial to inmates, it is not subject to the ex
post facto doctrine. 92 Furthermore, the legislature apparently intended
retroactive application because the statute contains no provision that the
87. Judge Clinton, joined by Judges Miller and Duncan, in concurrence, asserted that the
state constitutional prohibition is broader than its federal counterpart because Article I, sec-
tion 16 of the Texas Constitution places a ban on any "'retroactive law.'" Id. at ,463.
88. See supra note 82.
89. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6181-1, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (upon certification
by attorney general to governor, governor shall instruct that not more than 90 days good time
be credited all eligible inmates).
90. Id. § 2(b).
91. Ex parte Rutledge, 741 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc).
92. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 & n.12 (1981) (to be violative of ex post facto
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earlier parole eligibility date should only apply to inmates after the effec-
tive date of the Act, and several other amendments are expressly desig-
nated for prospective application.93 Thus, it appears that the immediate
impact of the amendments of the Seventieth Legislature discussed in this
article will be the availability of an earlier release from custody for many
members of the present prison population despite the apparently more
punitive thrust of much of the legislation.
The prospective changes in time computation will greatly compli-
cate Texas sentence law and prison administration. Different sets of
books will have to be maintained depending upon the date of the inmate's
offense.94 Consider, for example, the inmate who is convicted of aggra-
vated robbery committed before the effective date of the amendments.
This inmate is eligible for mandatory release. If such release is granted
but later revoked based upon a conviction for a new aggravated robbery,
committed after September 1, 1987, the inmate still would be eligible to
earn good time on his first sentence; however, no good time would be
earned on the second sentence either for the purpose of parole eligibility
or for mandatory release.
C. The Number of Permissible Charges and Disposition
1. Abolition of the Texas Carving Doctrine
In order to understand sentencing law, it is necessary to consider
legal rules at a number of different stages in the criminal justice process
which affect the disposition of a convicted defendant. The previously
discussed amendments regarding the administration of a sentence, good
time, and parole change the amount of time in physical custody that an
inmate convicted of a particular crime will serve. Just as post-sentence
clause, a statute must be (a) retrospective, and (b) disadvantageous to offender affected by the
statute).
93. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(c) (Vernon Supp. 1989); TEX.
REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6184o (Vernon Supp. 1989). The comments following each of the
amended statutes discussed herein provide that the statute is applicable to anyone convicted of
a crime, any element of which was committed after the effective date of the statute.
94. The speed with which conviction and sentencing are obtained varies greatly depend-
ing upon a number of factors, such as whether the accused was a fugitive for any period, the
length of the pre-arrest investigation, and whether there was a guilty plea or a trial. As a
result, the old rules may apply to someone received at the prison long after an inmate who is
subject to the new rules. An individual determination must be made in order to decide which
rules apply based upon the date of the commission of the offense. This date is determinative
rather than the date of conviction, sentence, or other more administratively convenient dates
because the concept of fair notice is implicit in the ex post facto doctrine. As the United States
Supreme Court held in the landmark case of Calder v. Bull, the central function of the ex post
facto prohibition is to prevent federal and state legislatures from enacting arbitrary or vindic-
tive legislation. 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 389 (1798).
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administration can affect time served, laws concerning events before the
sentence hearing can affect the disposition of a convicted defendant. For
example, limitations on the number of charges that can be brought limit
a defendant's maximum sentence exposure.
For more than a century, Texas law contained a significant limita-
tion on the number of convictions that could be obtained by the prosecu-
tion: The Texas Carving Doctrine. Although one criminal transaction
often violates more than one statutory offense, the carving doctrine lim-
ited the number of convictions to the number of transactions." The state
could "carve" any offense that it wanted out of a single transaction, but it
could only carve once.
In 1982, in Ex parte McWilliams,96 the court of criminal appeals
abolished the carving doctrine and adopted the federal standard based on
the "same offense" test of Blockburger v. United States.97 Blockburger
provides that if one act violates more than one statutory provision, con-
viction is permissible for each offense so long as each statutory offense
contains an element that the other offense does not.9" Unlike the carving
doctrine which focuses on the number of acts of the defendant, the
Blockburger test focuses upon the abstract elements of the offenses. 99
Under Blockburger, convictions are possible for multiple statutory of-
fenses despite a significant overlap in facts proved at trial for each of-
fense." ° For example, in Gore v. United States,'° the defendant sold
heroin on two occasions. Two transactions occurred and Gore was con-
victed twice on each of the following offenses: selling heroin with knowl-
edge that the substance was imported; selling heroin not in a stamped
package; and selling heroin without a prescription. °2 The proof of each
of the three statutory offenses was virtually identical, but three convic-
tions and consecutive sentences were permitted for each transaction.0 3
The combination of the demise of the carving doctrine and the en-
actment of new statutory provisions providing that consecutive sentences
will no longer be cumulated in determining parole eligibility appear to
provide potentially more stringent sentences for convicted Texas defend-
ants. However, other judicial and legislative developments concerning
95. Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc).
96. 634 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc).
97. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). See Ex parte McWilliams, 634
S.W.2d 815, 822, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc).
98. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
99. Id.
100. See id.
101. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
102. Id. at 387.
103. Id. at 386.
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joinder of offenses and double jeopardy protections complicate the issue
and appear to militate in favor of more concurrent and fewer consecutive
sentences in Texas.
2. The Partial Revival of the Carving Doctrine
Although Texas has abolished the carving doctrine, recent cases
have revived the approach taken by the carving doctrine by focusing on
the defendant's acts rather than the elements of the statutes in cases
where multiple trials rather than just multiple convictions were involved.
This partial revival of the carving doctrine began in May v. State."° May
was convicted of involuntary manslaughter based upon an indictment
which alleged that she operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated and, by
reason of her intoxication, drove her vehicle across the center median,
colliding with a car and killing the victim." 5 Following the involuntary
manslaughter conviction, May filed a habeas corpus petition asking for
dismissal of a pending driving-while-intoxicated prosecution. 0 6 The
trial court denied relief and the court of appeals affirmed in a straightfor-
ward application of Blockburger principles.
Comparing the elements of the two offenses, the court found that
each offense required proof of facts that the other did not: involuntary
manslaughter requires proof of intoxication causing the death of an indi-
vidual, and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated requires proof of
operating a motor vehicle upon a public road, highway, street or alley.° 7
Because the two offenses, as they appear in the Texas Penal Code, con-
tain separate elements, the offenses were held not to be the same offense
for double jeopardy purposes. Thus, the court of appeals determined
that the prior involuntary manslaughter conviction did not bar a later
driving-while-intoxicated conviction.
May argued that the driving-while-intoxicated prosecution should
be barred because that pending indictment alleged the same act of cross-
ing the median of a highway and colliding with another vehicle while
intoxicated that was an essential part of the state's involuntary man-
slaughter case. lOS The court of criminal appeals held that whether proof
of the same act was involved in both convictions was irrelevant to the
Blockburger analysis adopted by the court of criminal appeals 0 9 because,
104. 726 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
105. Id. at 576.
106. Id. at 574.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 576-77.
109. Id. at 574.
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as the Ex parte McWilliams 110 opinion noted:
The Blockburger test is satisfied if each statutory offense requires
the proof of a fact that the other does not. At trial there may be a
substantial overlap in the proof of each offense; however, it is the
separate statutory elements of each offense which must be examined
under this test. 1 ' I
The court of criminal appeals reversed the court of appeals, drawing
a distinction between multiple punishments at a single trial and succes-
sive prosecutions. 1 2 A second prosecution may be barred on double
jeopardy grounds if the second prosecution involves relitigation of factual
issues already resolved by the first." 3 Although McWilliams abandoned
the carving doctrine," 4 Blockburger was not adopted as the sole test for
determining jeopardy where an act violates two distinct statutes. 1 5 Ac-
cording to May, where successive prosecutions are involved, the carving
doctrine approach of examining the facts of the two cases is appropriate,
rather than the Blockburger approach of examining only the statutory
elements. The latter approach is appropriate only when multiple convic-
tions against one defendant are obtained at a single trial." I 6 Thus, May's
information charging driving while intoxicated was ordered dismissed
because the pending information charged a crime "consisting solely of
one or more of the elements of the crime for which she has already been
convicted."" 7
A few months after May, Ex parte Peterson demonstrated that
the sequence of prosecutions is irrelevant to the analysis in May.' ' In
Ex parte Peterson, the less serious driving-while-intoxicated prosecution
occurred first, 120 and a later involuntary manslaughter charge was dis-
missed based on the same analysis as in May.12' The court of criminal
appeals again held that even if a comparison of the two statutes reveals
elements sufficiently different to permit consecutive sentences, successive
prosecutions will be barred if the second prosecution requires relitigation
of factual issues already resolved by the first.' 22 Peterson's pending in-
110. 634 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc).
111. Id. at 824 (emphasis in original).
112. May v. State, 726 S.W.2d 573, 576-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
113. Id. at 575 (quoting Davis v. Herring, 800 F.2d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 1980)).
114. Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc).
115. May v. State, 726 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
116. Id. at 577.
117. Id. at 576-77.
118. 738 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
119. Id. at 690-92.
120. Id. at 689.
121. Id. at 691.
122. Id.
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voluntary manslaughter prosecution was dismissed1 23 because Peterson
already had been convicted of driving while intoxicated, a conviction
arising out of the same automobile accident alleged in the involuntary
manslaughter indictment. 124
The partial revival of the carving doctrine where successive prosecu-
tions are involved, rather than multiple punishments at the same trial,
has not been limited to the driving-while-intoxicated/involuntary man-
slaughter pairing of offenses. The court of criminal appeals and several
courts of appeals have applied the rationale of May and Ex parte Peterson
in cases involving different types of offenses. 125
3. Joinder and Concurrent Sentences
a. Law Prior to Seventieth Legislature
The distinction developed in May and Ex parte Peterson between
multiple punishments at one trial and separate punishments at successive
trials suggests a prosecution strategy of consolidating charges in one
prosecution where the prosecutor deems multiple punishments to be ap-
propriate. However, other developments in the law of joinder either
make such consolidation difficult or often will require that the defendant
receive concurrent sentences if joinder is accomplished. When the law
concerning joinder and consolidation of offenses is considered together
with the partial revival of the carving doctrine for successive prosecu-
tions, the potential sentence exposure of convicted defendants is dimin-
ished, and the impact of legislative changes forbidding the cumulation of
consecutive sentences for parole eligibility purposes is severely reduced.
To appreciate the impact of joinder and consolidation on potential
sentence length, a brief survey of the law in this area is necessary. Re-
cently, in Fortune v. State,126 the court of criminal appeals set forth the
two basic rules that had governed joinder of offenses under the prior
statute:
(1) the State may allege more than one offense in a single charging
instrument if the offenses constitute the repeated commission of the
same property offense under Title 7 of the Penal Code; and (2) the
State may not allege more than one non-property offense in a single
charging instrument regardless of the number of the transactions
involved. 127
The Fortune court explained that the first rule is derived from article
123. Id. at 691-92.
124. Id. at 691.
125. See, e.g., Herrera v. State, 756 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, no pet.).
126. 745 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc).
127. Id. at 366.
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21.24 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure which provides in part
that: "[t]wo or more offenses may be joined in a single indictment, infor-
mation, or complaint, with each offense stated in a separate count, if the
offenses arise out of the same criminal episode, as defined in Chapter 3 of
the Penal Code." '28 Prior to the revisions of the Seventieth Legislature,
the term "criminal episode" was defined narrowly in section 3.01 of the
Texas Penal Code as "the repeated commission of any one offense de-
fined in Title 7 [of the Penal Code] (Offenses Against Property)."1 29
The second rule stated above from Fortune is also derived from a
narrow reading of article 21.24 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
and section 3.01 of the Texas Penal Code which has been interpreted to
allow "the joinder of more than one offense in a charging instrument only
when it is the repeated commission of the same property offense." 130
Thus, as the court of criminal appeals delineated in Fortune, one charg-
ing instrument may not: "1) allege more than one non-property offense,
2) allege statutorily different property offenses, or; 3) allege one property
and one non-property offense." 1
3
'
When the state violates the joinder rules, the defense can file a mo-
tion to quash the indictment which should be granted if any of the three
situations listed above occur. 132 A second option for the defense is not to
file the motion to quash but instead to file a motion requesting that the
state be made to elect the count upon which it will proceed. 133 An elec-
tion to proceed on only one count will cure the joinder error, even if a
motion to quash previously was erroneously overruled. The state must
make the election by the end of the state's case and before the defense
begins to present evidence. However, if the defense files neither a motion
to quash nor a motion for election, misjoinder may still be challenged on
appeal because the error is regarded as fundamental based on the theory
that the trial court was without authority to render the second judgment
of conviction. 34 Despite the recent trend to require objection to charg-
ing instruments and to move away from the concept of fundamental er-
ror, the opportunity to challenge a misjoinder on appeal despite the
128. Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.24(a) (Supp. 1989)).
129. Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1989)). See also
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 28.01-33.05 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1989). Title VII offenses are:
arson, criminal mischief and other property damage or destruction, robbery, aggravated rob-
bery, burglary, criminal trespass, theft, fraud and computer crimes. Id.
130. Fortune v. State, 745 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc) (emphasis in
original).
131. Id.
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absence of objection was recently reaffirmed in Fortune.131
Two situations must be distinguished from the foregoing discussion
of the rules of joinder: pleading in the alternative and consolidation.
Where the prosecutor is unaware of the exact nature of the proof at trial,
the prosecutor may plead alternative crimes in separate counts at one
trial, 1 36 or he may create separate paragraphs based upon the same count
to allege alternative methods and means of committing the same
crime.1 37 Pleading in the alternative is not a joinder problem because
only one offense has occurred, and the jury is instructed that only one
verdict can be returned. For this reason, the state is not required to elect
a particular alternative.1 38
Consolidation also must be distinguished from joinder. Consolida-
tion brings together two or more adequately pleaded separate indict-
ments, which charge offenses arising from different transactions, to be
tried together. 39 Although the distinction between joinder and consoli-
dation may appear to be hypertechnical, there is a crucial difference:
consolidation may only occur with the consent of the defendant,"o while
joinder, if proper and upon adequate notice, can occur without the con-
sent of the defendant. Thus, the defendant can prevent consolidation by
objecting, although diligence is required because failure to object may be
construed as implied consent. Sentences for offenses separately indicted
and then consolidated may be consecutive. 4 1
Joinder of offenses involving the repeated commission of Title VII
offenses may occur without the consent of the defendant, and the defend-
ant has no right to demand such joinder. Prior to the Seventieth Legisla-
ture, joinder was allowed only in this limited situation, but the defendant
received an important benefit related to disposition where joinder oc-
curred. If notice had been duly given to consolidate several indictments
of the same Title VII offense, section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code re-
quired that the sentences run concurrently.' 42
b. Law after Seventieth Legislature
The joinder rules have been significantly altered by the Seventieth
135. Id. at 369-70.
136. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.24(a) (Vernon Supp. 1989).
137. Id. art. 21.24(b).
138. Fortune v. State, 745 S.W.2d 364, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc).
139. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.02 (Vernon 1974).
140. Id. § 3.04 (Vernon 1974) (defendant has the right to a severance of consolidated
offenses).
141. Fortune v. State, 745 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (en banc).
142. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.03 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1989).
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Legislature's amendment of section 3.01 of the Texas Penal Code, chang-
ing the definition of the term criminal episode. As of September 1, 1987,
"criminal episode" means the commission of two or more offenses,
regardless of whether the harm is directed toward or inflicted upon
more than one person or item of property, under the following cir-
cumstances: (1) the offenses are committed pursuant to the same
transaction or pursuant to two or more transactions that are con-
nected or constitute a common scheme or plan; or (2) the offenses
are the repeated commission of the same or similar offenses. '43
Under the previous restricted definition of criminal episode, joinder of
more than one offense within a single indictment was limited to the re-
peated commission of a single property crime, and all other combinations
of offenses within the same charging instrument were considered misjoin-
der. After the amendment, however, offenses no longer must be the same
offense so long as they are similar offenses. It is no longer necessary that
the offenses be the repeated commission of the same property offense,
because now two or more transactions involving any type of crime con-
nected by a common scheme or plan will suffice to permit joinder of all
offenses arising from that transaction within the same charging
instrument.
Misjoinder apparently is limited now to the joinder of two or more
statutorily distinct offenses that are alleged to have occurred pursuant to
two unrelated transactions. Only in this situation would it be necessary
to obtain the defendant's consent to consolidate offenses, and as before,
the defendant can prevent consolidation of offenses by objecting.
Although a much broader range of offenses can be joined now without
the defendant's consent, the benefit of concurrent sentences provided by
section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code remains unchanged and applies to
this broader range of permissibly joined offenses.'"
4. Charging and Disposition: The New Balance of Power
There have always been complex relationships in the law of joinder,
double jeopardy and carving, and the administration of cumulative crim-
inal sentences. Recent changes in the law of each of these areas has al-
tered the relationships in surprising and paradoxical ways. The demise
of the carving doctrine in Ex parte Mc Williams appeared to remove re-
strictions on the state's ability to obtain multiple convictions. 45 The
stated reason for abandoning carving in McWilliams was that the limita-
143. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.01 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
144. Id. § 3.03 (Vernon 1974) (although conviction may be had on all counts properly
consolidated at trial, sentences must run concurrently).
145. See supra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
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tion of one conviction per transaction encouraged crime. 146 The action
of the Seventieth Legislature in eliminating the cumulation of consecu-
tive sentences for determining parole eligibility would appear to reinforce
the state's purpose in pursuing multiple convictions and consecutive
sentences. By prohibiting cumulation of consecutive sentences into one
aggregated offense for parole eligibility, the Seventieth Legislature ap-
pears to have found a method to ensure that the greater potential for
multiple sentences will translate into more time served in prison.
On the other hand, the action of the same Legislature in greatly
expanding the previously narrow range of cases subject to joinder with-
out the defendant's consent, while retaining the concomitant requirement
of concurrent treatment of charges so joined, appears to create an incen-
tive for more concurrent sentences.' 47 The new definition of criminal
episode which allows for more liberal joinder is permissive, not
mandatory, and the prosecution can skirt the concurrent sentence provi-
sion of section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code simply by not joining the
charges in one trial and obtaining multiple convictions in successive pros-
ecutions. The defendant has no right to demand such joinder; the de-
fendant's only right is the absolute right to demand severance under
section 3.04 of the Texas Penal Code.' 48
However, in addition to the significant cost to already limited
prosecutorial resources caused by the need to conduct separate trials,
there is the possible loss of the opportunity to prosecute a second case
created by the partial revival of the carving doctrine. May and Ex parte
Peterson have recognized that the second prosecution may be barred if
the state's case requires relitigation of facts already developed in the first
trial, even if the statutory offenses involved in both prosecutions are sepa-
rate and distinct under the Blockburger standard. 149 The prosecutor may
eschew the opportunity to join two or more offenses committed pursuant
to the same transaction because of the loss of the opportunity to obtain
consecutive sentences, only to find that a second trial is blocked because
proof of important elements of a second charge were already litigated in
a previous trial. Those offenses arising from the same transaction which
must clearly be joined in one trial, and thus are subject to the concurrent
sentence protection, are also the type of offenses which are more likely to
be subject to the prohibition of relitigation of the same essential facts.
To the extent that two or more offenses result from completely unre-
146. Ex parte McWilliams, 634 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (en banc).
147. See supra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
148. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.04 (Vernon 1974).
149. See supra notes 104-24 and accompanying text.
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lated transactions, they will not be subject to the relitigation of the same
facts protection recognized in May and Ex parte Peterson, and such of-
fenses would not be susceptible to joinder. However, a defendant can
prevent multiple convictions and sentences for offenses arising from un-
related transactions at one trial by objecting to misjoinder. 5 ° If the state
is going to obtain multiple convictions in these circumstances, the state
must be willing to conduct separate prosecutions. Of course, the defend-
ant can make this much easier for the prosecution by pleading guilty to
several charges and waiving any consolidation objections. However, the
chief bargaining tool of a criminal defendant is the ability to require the
state to go through the cost, uncertainty, and time of a criminal trial on
every charge. The combination of (1) the power of the defense to force
separate trials of unrelated offenses by objecting to consolidation; (2) the
protection afforded to the defense of concurrent sentences for joined re-
lated offenses; and (3) the potential double jeopardy claim which can be
made to successive prosecution of related offenses give the defense some
bargaining power in plea negotiations. This bargaining power may offset
some of the increased potential leverage gained by the prosecution
through the abolition of the carving doctrine, the expanded power to join
different offenses in one prosecution, and the new rules prohibiting cu-
mulation of consecutive sentences.
V. CONCLUSION
Several sentence administration amendments of the Seventieth Leg-
islature appear to make sentences in Texas more onerous. A number of
statutory offenses are now designated to be ineligible for mandatory re-
lease, thus making early release from prison dependent upon executive
grace. The maximum award of good time available to inmates has been
reduced and the retroactivity of individual increases in good time and
restoration of forfeited good time is threatened. Consecutive sentences
no longer may be cumulated into one aggregate sentence in determining
minimum parole eligibility. Additional statutory offenses have been
added to the list of those ineligible for the benefits of the Prison Manage-
ment Act.
Yet despite the apparently more punitive thrust of the new legisla-
tion, a number of factors combine to undercut its impact. The Seventieth
Legislature's general reduction in the date of parole eligibility will apply
to inmates already sentenced, while the more punitive provisions will be
applied prospectively by statute or because of the demands of the ex post
150. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 3.04 (Vernon 1971) (defendant has absolute right to
sever offenses not properly joined in one trial).
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facto doctrine. The history of more liberal grants of parole release
caused by the continuing pressure of prison overcrowding suggest that
smaller awards of good time will not translate into longer average peri-
ods of incarceration. More liberal rules of joinder with concomitant con-
current sentence guarantees combine with increased double jeopardy
protections to create a likelihood of fewer consecutive sentences in the
future, while the new rules providing more stringent treatment of consec-
utive sentences do not apply retroactively.
No clear policy direction has emerged from legal developments in
the law affecting the disposition of criminal defendants, but it is clear
that the complexity and the possibility of confusion have expanded. A
number of different rules of sentence administration will apply depending
upon the date of the inmate's conviction. Offenses that make a convicted
defendant ineligible for good-time advancement of parole eligibility now
differ from the offenses triggering ineligibility for good time to determine
mandatory release. Depending upon the type of probation involved and
whether the judge or jury determines sentence, the eligibility rules for
probation vary, and these rules differ from those concerning eligibility for
parole, mandatory release, and various types of administrative good-time
credit.
In evaluating criminal cases, prosecutors and defense attorneys will
have to weigh a myriad of rules concerning probation, parole, and good
time, all of which affect the actual disposition of a convicted defendant.
Charging strategies, plea negotiations, and lesser included offense deci-
sions cannot be undertaken intelligently without consideration of the
rules of sentence administration. Understanding the intricate and com-
plex interrelationships among the numerous agencies and rules that affect
the disposition of a convicted defendant is essential to effective prosecu-
tion and defense of criminal cases.
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